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   This paper empirically examines the spatial and intertemporal price relations of grains 
in Pakistan’s Punjab. The salient feature of the paper is that quantity variables such as 
market surplus and government release are incorporated in the price arbitrage model to 
quantify the effects of government interventions. Regression analysis using three-year cross-
section data shows that the farm-gate prices of wheat after harvest are mostly explained by 
the government support price while those of Basmati paddy have more unexplained 
variation. This difference could be due to a difference in the price support mechanism. 
Investigation on intertemporal price relations shows that wholesale wheat prices regularly 
increase at the rate of storage costs in the first half of a food year, and that the price rise is 
repressed by the government release in the second half only in a normal year. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The performance of agricultural markets in developing countries has been an 
important issue in economic development. Their efficient performance provides 
producers with information on technology and consumers’ preferences, thereby 
inducing dynamic production responses to changing market conditions. This dynamics 
is an indispensable part of economic development. From individual households’ 
viewpoint, the efficient performance reduces price risk since it prevents unnecessary 
price volatility. Since numerous developing countries are currently promoting 
marketing liberalisation policies, the issue of market performance and price relations is 
attracting the attention of academic and policy circles. Whether the reforms will have 
the expected effects depends on the performance of each market involved. 
This paper empirically investigates the performance of grain markets in the 
Punjab province of Pakistan. The primary objectives of the paper are to analyse market 
price relations and to test for the effects of government interventions on them. The 
analysis focuses on wheat, the staple food of the nation, supplemented by an analysis on 
Basmati rice, a major export commodity of Pakistan, for purposes of comparison. Most 
of the existing studies on market performance in Pakistan are descriptive, except for the 
work by Faiz Mohammad, who analyses market prices using a simple econometric 
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model [Mohammad (1983, 1985); Mohammad and Tahir (1988)]. This study extends 
the existing literature by incorporating quantity variables, such as market surplus or 
government release, to explain the relations of prices realised in private marketing 
channels. It will be shown that the farm-gate prices of wheat after harvest are explained 
mostly by the government support price while the effects of government wheat release 
on the market prices in lean months vary depending on the characteristics of each year. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the analytical framework is 
explained briefly. The empirical strategy in this study is to go back to the arbitrage 
condition, which needs to be satisfied for prices in a spatial or intertemporal competitive 
equilibrium. Following Section 3 that describes the study area and data, Section 4 
investigates the spatial relationship between government support prices and farm-gate 
prices after harvest. Section 5 tests for the effects of government wheat release on 




There is a large and expanding literature on market performance in developing 
countries. Starting with the classic works by Lele (1971) and Jones (1972), the literature 
now covers a wide range of countries and a number of sophisticated methods [e.g. 
Ravallion (1986); Hayami and Kawagoe (1993); Baulch (1995); Goletti, Ahmed, and 
Farid (1995)]. As is shown in Baulch (1996), most of the recent, sophisticated time-
series models have failed to incorporate the non-linearity caused by the existence of 
transaction costs and non-continuous trade flows. Therefore, instead of applying these 
time-series methods, this paper goes back to the arbitrage condition for prices in a 
spatial or intertemporal competitive equilibrium [Takayama and Judge (1971); William 
and Wright (1991)] that forms the basis of the recent models. 
Arbitrage (in)equality is satisfied when either of the following two is observed. 
First, if transactions occur between two states of a commodity, the price difference 
should equal the transaction costs; the difference should not be larger than the 
transaction costs, because it implies an arbitrage opportunity. Second, if transactions do 
not occur, the price difference should be smaller than or equal to the transaction costs. 
The transactions between two states include spatial (transportation/trade), intertemporal 
(storage), or vertical (processing) transactions. When the arbitrage condition holds as an 
equality, prices in the corresponding two markets are said to be integrated spatially, 
intertemporally, or vertically. 
The arbitrage condition prevents unnecessarily volatile movement of prices. It 
transmits price signals smoothly from urban food-deficit to rural food-surplus areas or 
from a food-deficit to food-surplus period. In this sense, the condition is necessary for 
the efficient performance of markets. A well-integrated market system is the key to an 
efficient allocation of productive resources. It also contributes to household and 
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regional food security. When the arbitrage condition is satisfied, price risk is reduced 
because a local shock is transmitted to integrated markets. 
 
3. STUDY AREA AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
Wheat Marketing 
Wheat is the most important source of calory intake in Pakistani diet. Although 
most farmers grow wheat and its per-acre yield has increased significantly during the 
last four decades, Pakistan has not yet achieved self-sufficiency. In recent years, one to 
two million tonnes of wheat are imported to supplement the domestic production of 
approximately 15 million tonnes. 
In the current system of wheat marketing, the public sector and private traders 
coexist. Although deregulation policies in wheat marketing have been implemented 
since the mid-1980s, public interventions have remained important.1 The government 
procures wheat from producers directly; it releases wheat flour to consumers directly 
through utility stores owned by a government corporation or indirectly through private 
markets. The price of wheat through this route is fixed by the federal government pan-
territorially: the provincial food departments and the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and 
Services Corporation (PASSCO)2 procure wheat in harvest months at the “support” 
price; the provincial food departments release wheat flour in lean months at the “issue” 
price. 
At the same time, the private sector is allowed to market wheat with free prices. 
Instead of bringing wheat directly to public procurement centres, most farmers sell to 
middlemen such as village shopkeepers and beoparis (village brokers). These traders 
sell wheat to the public procurement centres or to other private traders. Primary 
wholesale markets (mandis) are well-developed in Pakistan, especially in the Punjab. 
Farmers and middlemen bring wheat to these markets and sell through arhtis 
(commission agents) who are registered in the Market Committee [Government of 
Punjab (1991)]. The arhtis collect wheat from growers and primary middlemen and 
deliver it to millers and wholesalers. 
At the national level, the public wheat procurement accounts for about four 
million tonnes or just below 30 percent of the total production. Assuming the market 
surplus share of wheat to be in the range of 40 to 45 percent [Cornelisse and Naqvi 
(1987, 1989)], approximately one-third of the total marketed wheat does not enter the 
public marketing chain at all. A substantial portion of the remaining two-thirds also 
1The deregulation policies include the lifting of the ban on the private inter-provincial trade of wheat 
and wheat de-rationing. See Cornelisse and Naqvi (1987, 1989); Alderman, Chaudhry, and Garcia (1988); 
Pinckney (1989) and Ender (1992) for references. 
2The PASSCO is a parastatal agency that procures and stores wheat for inter-provincial distribution. 
Among the four provinces of Pakistan, the Punjab is the only surplus province. The PASSCO is responsible 
for the provision of wheat to the deficit provinces. 
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enters the private marketing chain because the government releases wheat stock to 
wholesale markets to stabilise prices in lean months. This portion is much larger than 
the portion released to consumers directly through utility stores [Pinckney (1989); 
Ender (1992)]. 
This institutional framework implies two points where government interventions 
potentially affect prices realised in the private marketing chain. The first point is the 
effect of government procurement on farm-gate prices in harvest months (Section 4). The 
second is the effect of government release on market prices in lean months (Section 5). 
 
Basmati Marketing 
Basmati paddy/rice marketing has a different institutional framework since 
paddy is husked and cleaned in rice mills. Basmati rice is produced in the Punjab and is 
one of the most important export commodities of Pakistan. Until 1987/88, the export of 
Basmati rice was a public monopoly. A parastatal corporation, the Rice Export 
Corporation of Pakistan (RECP) procured cleaned rice from private rice millers and 
middlemen at the support price fixed by the federal government. Since 1987/88, 
deregulation has been proceeding rather well in rice export. Especially, fiscal year 
1990-91 witnessed a dramatic change, when the share of the private sector in Basmati 
export increased rapidly from almost nil to more than one-third. 
The federal government announces the support price for paddy in the same 
manner as wheat. The PASSCO has responsibility for supporting paddy prices. 
However, the quantity of Basmati paddy procured by the PASSCO  was less than 2 
percent of the total production. The price of Basmati paddy is supported indirectly 
through the procurement of cleaned rice by the RECP. Between growers and millers, 
various middlemen exist: growers may sell through commission agents (arhtis) or 
village brokers (beoparis) on a commission basis; sell to the agents of rice millers; or 




Three sources of data are used in the analysis.3 First, to investigate the price 
behaviour of wheat and Basmati paddy at farm gate, three-year cross-section data on 
household production and consumption in the rice-wheat zone of Pakistan’s Punjab are 
used in Section 4. The initial data were collected from five villages in the Sheikhupura 
district by the Punjab Economic Research Institute (PERI), Lahore.4 The data set 
3Data sets used in the regressions are available from the author on request. 
4The general sampling procedure and the aggregated results for each year are reported in Haque and 
Saleem (1990); Cheema and Saleem (1993); and Saleem and Cheema (1993). Thanks are due to Dr 
Muhammad Jameel Khan, Director, PERI, for access to the surveys. See Kurosaki (1995) for an analysis of 
these sample observations, using a non-separable household model.
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includes 97 household observations each for three fiscal years from 1988-89 through 
1990-91, a period corresponding to 1989-90 — 1991-92 food years.5 
Second, weekly and monthly prices in major wholesale markets are available 
from published sources. Wholesale markets in the Punjab are regulated by provincial 
laws and regulations including the one that obliges the Market Committee to report 
prices [Government of Punjab (1991)]. In Section 5, monthly prices of wheat in ten 
major wholesale markets in the province (Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, 
Gujranwala, Sialkot, Sargodha, Okara, Sahiwal, and Sheikhupura) during 1989-90 to 
1991-92 food years are used. The data source is Monthly Statistical Bulletin issued by 
the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Karachi. 
Third, the quantity of wheat and Basmati procured by public agencies and the 
quantity of wheat released by the Punjab Food Department are obtained from each 
agency involved. District level data in each month for the period 1989-90 to 1991-92 
food years are used in the analysis of wheat release in Section 5. 
 
4. EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT PRICES 
ON FARM-GATE PRICES AFTER HARVEST 
This section investigates the spatial relations of prices just after harvest, using the 
three-year cross-section data. The data include information on the farm-gate prices of 
wheat and Basmati paddy after harvest. Most sample households sold these 
commodities immediately after harvest in the village they lived in. Enumerators 
recorded the prices received by farmers for the most representative transaction. Some 
farmers brought the commodities directly to the government procurement centre or to 
the town mandi. In these cases, transportation costs were adjusted to obtain the farm-
gate price. Let Pf denote the farm-gate price recorded in this way. 
 
Analytical and Empirical Models 
Since Pf is the price observed in actual transactions in the villages, the task is to 
test whether the arbitrage equality holds or not between the farm-gate price and the 
price in the town (P*). Denoting per-unit transportation costs from the farm to the town 
as T, the arbitrage relation is expressed algebraically as 
 P* = Pf + T ... ... ... ... ... ... (1) 
Assuming absolute market margins, the following simple model of transportation cost is 
used in the empirical investigation. 
 T = β1 D + β2 1/Q ... ... ... ... ... (2) 
5A food year corresponds to a period from May to April. This implies a one-year lag in wheat 
accounting. For example, the wheat crop harvested in April-May 1990 is counted as produce of the 1989-90 
fiscal year but as foodgrain for the 1990-91 food year. 
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where β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated, D is the distance of the farm from the 
town, and Q is the quantity marketed. β1 is marginal transportation cost per unit-
distance that is invariant to Q and β2 is a fixed cost of each transaction. When both β1 
and β2 are positive, scale economy exists in transportation.6 Since the focus of this 
paper is on the effects of government intervention, the government support price in each 
year (Pp) is used as a proxy for P*. Since Pp is not affected by transactions in villages, Pf 
is used as the dependent variable explained by Pp and other independent variables. 
Thus, by inserting (2) into (1) and adding an error term u, an empirical equation 
becomes 
 Pf = α1 + α2Pp – β1D – β2 1/Q + u ... ... ... (3) 
Equation (3) is estimated by a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method since the variable 
1/Q is endogenous to household decisions. Using all sample observations with market 
surplus, the model is estimated for wheat and Basmati paddy. 
 
Estimation Results 
Table 1 reports the estimation results for wheat. First, the regression fit is high 
Table 1 
2SLS Estimation Results for Wheat Farm-gate Prices 
Explanatory Variables 




























Adjusted R2 0.989 0.989  
Notes: (1) Estimated by 2SLS with instrumental variables that include Pp, D, the operational acreage of the farm, 
family size, livestock size, and dummy variables for tractor and tubewell ownership. t-statistics are in the 
parenthesis. 
 (2) Numbers under the column “Statistics of Exp. Var.” show mean and standard deviation (in the brackets) of 
explanatory variables. 
 (3) *** significant at 1 percent level (two-sided test). 
 (4) Dependent variable is Pf whose mean is 93.20 and standard deviation is 11.50. 
 (5) The number of observations is 182. 
 # Pp (support price for wheat) was 85, 96, and 112 Rs/40kg in 1988-89, 1989-90, and 1990-91 respectively. 
6Scale economy also results from a case when the marginal transportation cost itself decreases with 
Q(e.g., T = β1 + β2⋅ 1/Q – β3 Q, β3>0). However, this extension brings in a multicollinearity problem between 
Q and 1/Q. Therefore, a simple model in the text is used. 
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(adjusted R2 = 0.99). Second, coefficient estimates for transportation costs are of the 
correct sign. However, the coefficient on 1/Q is not statistically significant. Therefore, 
the model is re-estimated without the variable 1/Q (“Model B”). Third, the coefficient 
on Pp is 0.95, reasonably close to unity, which is the theoretical prediction in (1).7 
The regression results for wheat show that the farm-gate price after harvest is 
explained almost wholly by the government support price and the distance to the town. 
Recall that most sample households did not bring wheat to the procurement centre but 
sold it to private middlemen in the villages. Even in these cases, the farm-gate prices are 
integrated efficiently with the support price in the town. Active competition among 
middlemen and substantial procurement by the government in the town are responsible 
for the efficient performance. 
A similar regression model is estimated for Basmati paddy (Table 2). First, 
adjusted R2 is very low, showing that a large portion of price variation is not explained 
by the support price, the distance to the town, and the quantity marketed. Second, both 
Table 2 






























Adjusted R2 0.376 0.354  
Notes: (1), (2),  (3) see Table 1.  
 (4) Dependent variable is Pp whose mean is 133.50 and standard deviation is 3.44. 
 (5) The number of observations is 287. 
 # Pp (support price for Basmati paddy) was 135, 143.5, and 150 Rs/40kg in 1988-89, 1989-90, 
and 1990-91 respectively. 
7Strictly speaking, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that α2 = 1 at 1 percent level. However, P* 
in the theoretical model in (1) should be a price in the town net of marketing costs that are not incurred in 
transactions in villages. These marketing costs include, for example, commission fee, facility usage fee, the 
opportunity cost of waiting in front of the procurement centre, etc. If the variable  Pp in (3) is replaced by the 
support price discounted by 3 percent, the estimate for α2 becomes much closer to unity and α2 = 1 is no 
longer rejected. In this sense, the coefficient estimate of 0.95 for α2 is “reasonably” close to unity. 
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coefficient estimates on D and 1/Q are negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
the existence of scale economy in transportation. The contrasting results for the 
coefficient on 1/Q between wheat and Basmati could be due to a difference in the 
nature of the two commodities. Wheat is a staple food for which village demand exists 
even for a smaller quantity. On the other hand, since Basmati paddy is a cash crop in the 
area and has to be sent to rice mills for processing, a larger lot in a village has a natural 
advantage in transportation. Third, the coefficient on Pp is 0.32, significantly smaller 
than unity, which is the theoretical prediction of perfect arbitrage. 
The contrast is striking: the farm-gate price of wheat is explained well by the 
support price and the distance, with the coefficient on the support price close to unity; 
the farm-gate price of Basmati paddy is not explained well by these variables and the 
coefficient on the support price is not close to unity. 
 
Implications 
Three implications could be derived from the above findings. First, the effects of 
government support prices on farm-gate prices differ from commodity to commodity, 
depending on the way the support price policy is implemented. A public procurement 
centre for wheat is opened in the town every year with substantial procurement, 
resulting in high integration of farm-gate prices with town market prices of wheat; the 
direct procurement of Basmati paddy by the public sector is negligible, resulting in non-
smooth transmission of procurement prices to the farm gate. When the effects of a 
revision in support prices are discussed, the exact way in which the support prices affect 
the prices received by farmers needs to be considered. 
 Second, from individual household’s viewpoint, ex ante price risk is smaller 
for wheat than for Basmati paddy. The regression results show that wheat price risk at 
the time of wheat planting is minimal if the support price is announced by that time. 
Officially, the support price for wheat is to be announced in early October when wheat 
sowing begins. However, the announcement is often delayed or revised later. Upward 
price revisions happened in the 1990-91, 1993-94, and 1995-96 fiscal years after wheat 
was sown. Reliable and timely announcement of wheat support price is desirable, from 
farmers’ viewpoint, so as to reduce uncertainty. 
 Third, when public procurement is implemented well, as in wheat in the study 
area, the government support price is transmitted efficiently to village markets. Even 
when farmers do not sell at the procurement centre, competition among middlemen 
forces the farm-gate price at the support price minus transportation costs. In other 
words, the rural marketing network of private middlemen contributes to the spatial 
integration of wheat prices. Obviously, further research is needed to generalise this 
result for the whole province or for Pakistan. Nevertheless, the existing literature on the 
spatial integration of wholesale markets in Pakistan seems to offer reasons to expect the 
relations to hold to some extent. Studies by Faiz Mohammad (1983, 1985), who 
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examined market price correlations, and by Kurosaki (1994), who applied Ravallion’s 
model of short-run and long-run integration, all support the view that most wholesale 
markets in Pakistan’s Punjab are integrated spatially. 
 
5.  EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT RELEASE ON THE 
      SEASONALITY OF WHOLESALE WHEAT PRICES 
This section focuses on how the public release of wheat to markets in lean 
months affects intertemporal price changes. The data on monthly wholesale prices in 
ten major markets in the Punjab and the district-wise data on the quantity of wheat 
release in the province are used in this section (Section 3). 
 
Analytical Framework 
Arbitrage (in)equality for the intertemporal transactions (i.e., storage) is said to 
hold when either of the following relations is satisfied between the current price (Pt) and 
the immediate future price (Pt+1) [Williams and Wright (1991)]: 
 (Pt + C) (1 + r) = Et [Pt+1], St > 0 ... ... ... (4a) 
 (Pt + C) (1 + r) ≥ Et [Pt+1], St = 0 ... ... ... (4b) 
where C is physical storage costs per period, r is the interest rate, Et [..] is an 
expectation operator at t, and St is the quantity of private storage carried over from 
period t to t+1. 
In the study area, the provincial government releases wheat to markets in the lean 
months at a fixed issue price (Section 3). The difference between the issue price and the 
procurement price does not cover all the storage costs from harvest months to the end of 
a food year [Pinckney (1989); Ender (1992)]. Two extreme cases are useful to stylise 
private storage activities in this context. 
First, if wheat released by the government and wheat stored by the private sector 
are perfect substitutes, and if the public release is continued as long as market demand 
exists at the issue price,8 then the private sector stores only in the early months when it 
expects zero public release (the equality in (4a) holds). Once the private sector expects 
positive public release, no private storage is carried over since it inevitably incurs a loss 
(the inequality in (4b) holds). This is a situation with full government effects. 
On the contrary, if wheat released by the government and wheat stored by the 
private sector form two segmented markets, or if the public release is cut off with 
probability one at a level lower than the market demand at the issue price, then market 
demand for private storage continues to exist even when the government releases wheat. 
Therefore, market prices continue to rise regularly throughout a food year, following 
the equality in (4a). This is a situation with no government effects. 
8This is the official stance of the government release policy [Pinckney (1989)]. 
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Empirical Model and Estimation Results 
Based on the theoretical model in (4), this paper proposes the following 
empirical model, which allows the impact of public release of wheat to be estimated 
simultaneously with the seasonal price patterns: 
 
 Pt  =  Pt–1 ⋅ exp (α + β Dg, t) + ut ... ... ... ... (5) 
 
where α and β are parameters to be estimated, Dg is a dummy variable for government 
wheat release, and u is an error term with zero mean. α is an estimate for the rate of total 
storage costs,9 which should have a positive value. β represents the effects of 
government release on price changes. If it is zero, the government wheat release has no 
effect on market prices; if it is negative, price rises are repressed by government release; 
and if β completely offsets the total storage costs (α+β=0), the government release at 
the issue price stabilises market prices completely, a situation with full government 
effects. 
Dg,t is defined as a threshold dummy variable that takes the value of unity when 
per-capita release in a district in month t exceeds some critical level and takes the value 
of zero otherwise. This is to grasp the effects of an active government intervention into 
private markets, which occur in the late months of a food year (Figure 1). 
The model in (5) is estimated by a maximum likelihood (ML) method assuming 
the normality of u. Table 3 gives results in which the threshold level for Dg,t is chosen at 
2.5 kg per capita.10 In Model A, α and β are allowed to vary from year to year. Since 
the null hypothesis that α is constant over years is not rejected at 10 percent by the 
Wald test, estimation results with the restriction of constant α are reported as well 
(Model B). 
According to the results of Model B, α is estimated at 1.7 percent per month, or 
21 percent per year. This is the estimate for total storage costs. According to State Bank 
of Pakistan Bulletin, market interest rates during the study period were about 11 percent 
(the average lending rate from commercial banks to the private sector) or 12 to 12.5 
percent  (the  short-term  lending  rate  from  the   Agricultural   Development  Bank  of  
9This approximation is more precise when physical storage cost C is proportional to the initial value 
of the commodity. By inserting C = c Pt in the left-hand side of the equality in (4a), 
 (Pt + C)(1 + r) = Pt(1 + c)(1 + r) = Pt ⋅ exp (α) = Et [Pt+1] 
 ∴ α ≈ c + r 
The physical storage costs include storage loss, rental fee for storage space, chemicals costs, etc. Among 
them, the storage loss, which is expected to be the most important in the conditions in Pakistan, is likely to be 
proportional to the initial quantity. Therefore, the approximation of C by c Pt might be justifiable. 
10In the initial regression, α and β are allowed to vary from market to market and from year to year. 
However, since differences among markets are not statistically significant (a finding consistent with spatially 
integrated markets), estimation results without location dummies are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
ML Estimation Results for Intertemporal Wheat Price Relations 
(Asymptotic t-statistics are in the parenthesis) 
Parameter Model A Model B 
α1989-90 0.0208 (3.676)***   
α1990-91 0.0175 (3.371)***   
α1991-92 0.0139 (3.296)***   
αcommon   0.0167 (5.882)**
* 
β1989-90 –0.0140 (–1.872)* –0.0099 (–1.756)* 
β1990-91 –0.0043 (–0.633) –0.0035 (–0.667) 
β1991-92 0.0076 (1.334) 0.0048 (1.010) 
R2 0.946 0.946 
Log likelihood –820.440 –820.925 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is Pt whose mean is 114.8 and standard deviation is 16.0. 
 (2) The number of observations is 300 (=10 markets × 3 years × 10 months). Each year in each 
market has ten months to avoid the discontinuity of wheat in a food year. The model in (5) is 
estimated for Pt with t =June to March. 
 (3) In each year with 100 observations, the government release dummy (Dg) takes the value of 
unity in 53 cases (1989-90), 54 cases (1990-91) and 51 cases (1991-92). 
 (4) *significant at 10 percent level; **significant at 5; ***significant at 1 percent level (two-
sided test). 
 
Pakistan). A reliable study estimated the physical storage loss at around 7 percent per 
year [Pinckney (1989)]. Therefore, the estimate for total storage costs at 21 percent 
seems reasonable, attributable to interests (12 percent), storage loss (7 percent), and 
other physical storage costs (2 percent). 
 Parameter estimate for β is significantly negative in 1989-90 but it is not 
significant in the next two years. Therefore, the government release repressed price rises 
in 1989-90 but its effects were not discernible in 1990-91 and 1991-92. On the other 
hand, the null hypothesis that α+β=0 for 1989-90 was rejected at 10 percent by the 
Wald test for both models. This suggests that even in the year 1989-90 when the 
government release did repress market price rises, the prices did not stay at the issue 
price but increased at a repressed rate. 
 
Implications 
 Several interpretations for these findings could be given. The first is the way 
the government releases wheat. In spite of the official policy of unlimited release at the 
issue price, the government actually follows its annual schedule for wheat release with 
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some flexibility to adjust the exact quantity to the ongoing market situation. Therefore, 
the realised quantity of government release is likely to be short of the market demand 
but able to meet its substantial portion. From private traders’ viewpoint, there is 
uncertainty regarding how sufficient the government release in the next month will be. 
Because of this uncertainty, the private sector has an incentive to store wheat even in 
lean months. 
Second, government-released and privately-stored wheat are neither perfect 
substitutes nor segmented commodities. The biggest reason for this imperfect 
substitutability is that a major portion of the government-released wheat comes to the 
market as wheat flour. Demand for wheat comprises direct demand for consumption 
and derived demand for storage. The first demand can be met by the government-
released wheat flour, but the storage demand cannot be met by the flour. In addition to 
that, a difference in quality might exist between government-released and privately-
stored wheat. 
These interpretations are helpful in explaining the difference among years. 
Judging from the long-term trend, the national wheat production in 1988-89 was close 
to normal while that in 1989-90 and 1990-91 was below normal in each year. In a food 
year after a bad domestic harvest, the uncertainty regarding government release 
increases. The substitutability between government-released and privately-stored wheat 
decreases because the premium for storability increases. Therefore, the effects of 
government release on price changes become insignificant in a bad harvest year, as in 
the regression results for 1990-91 and 1991-92. Since the actual quantities of 
government wheat release in these two years were not below the quantity in 1989-90 
(Figure 1), the observed price relations are hard to justify ex post. Nevertheless, it might 
have been individually rational ex ante for private traders to keep storage, preparing for 
the possibility of a significant decrease in the quantity of government release.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper examined the price relations of grains in Pakistan’s Punjab and the 
effects of government interventions on them. Investigation on spatial price relations 
after harvest found that the farm-gate prices of wheat were mostly explained by the 
support price whereas those of Basmati paddy had more unexplained variation. This 
paper suggested that the difference was due to a difference in the price support 
mechanism. In the second empirical investigation, intertemporal price relations and the 
effects of public wheat release on them were examined using wholesale market prices. 
It was found that wheat prices regularly increased at the rate of storage costs in the first 
half of a food year, but the price rise was repressed by the government release in the 
second half in a normal year. 
To generalise these findings, the price relations in the first half of a food year 
after harvest were close to those predicted by the arbitrage condition. In the sense that 
142 Takashi Kurosaki 
the arbitrage condition is necessary for a competitive equilibrium, the price relations 
were fairly efficient. Prices were found to be integrated spatially and intertemporally so 
that their excess volatility was prevented. It was suggested that the efficiency was 
achieved by competition among private traders who are engaged in trade and storage. 
On the other hand, the effects of government wheat release on intertemporal price 
relations in lean months varied from year to year, the variation not explained by a 
simple arbitrage argument. In a year after a bad harvest, government-released and 
privately-stored wheat might become less substitutable; thus, from private traders’ 
viewpoint, uncertainty increases. It is left for further research to examine whether this is 
a distortion created by government interventions in efficient private marketing or a 
reflection of private traders’ inability to efficiently deal with the uncertainty inherent in 
lean months. 
Four implications, relevant to Pakistan’s agricultural marketing policies, can be 
derived from these findings. First, private traders in Pakistan are capable of achieving 
efficient price relations so that a marginal decrease in public interventions in the current 
set-up could not lead to exploitation by traders. In this sense, the findings support the 
current marketing policies of deregulation and liberalisation in Pakistan. 
Second, the above point should be read with a caution. Empirical findings have 
suggested a possibility of inefficiency in private marketing chains in lean months. The 
implication is against a radical decrease in public interventions in wheat marketing. 
Considering these two implications, for example, an attempt to bring the price 
differential between the support and the issue prices closer to the opportunity cost of 
public storage would increase the efficiency of overall wheat marketing. 
Third, reliable implementation of government marketing policies would enhance 
the efficiency of private marketing and farm production. For example, reliable and 
timely announcement of wheat support price is desirable to reduce uncertainty from 
farmers’ viewpoint; formulation of more concrete and reliable policy rules in 
implementing the wheat procurement and release policies, including quick provision of 
detailed market information to private traders, could stabilise grain prices effectively. 
Fourth, Basmati paddy prices at the farm level had more unexplained variation 
than wheat prices. Whether the unexplained variation can be explained efficiently by a 
difference in marketing methods and in opportunity costs of production factors for 
farmers and middlemen is a very interesting and promising avenue for future research,11 
for which more detailed information on marketing is required. Considering the transient 
nature of Basmati marketing in the study period (Section 3), it would be safe to expect 
liberalisation policies which encourage competition among private traders and millers to 
contribute to better performance of local paddy markets. 
As a final remark, three policy implications are given for agricultural marketing 
research in developing countries in general. First, even in Pakistan’s Punjab with a long 
11Hayami and Kawagoe (1993) explored this direction for the case of upland crops in Indonesia. 
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history of private traders, how close the price relations are to the ideal, efficient 
relations varies from commodity to commodity and period to period. Representative 
analysis or average-based analysis might conceal these differences. Second, when 
private marketing channels coexist with government procurement and release, it might 
not be relevant to use government procurement price as the producer price and 
government release price as the consumer price. Prices in the private channels reflect 
the ongoing market conditions including government interventions. The relations of 
these prices need to be analysed comprehensively. Finally, a marketing reform has a 
different impact depending on the location and timing of its implementation. Space and 
time should be incorporated explicitly in the analytical model; quantity variables, such 
as quantity traded or government release, should be included explicitly in the empirical 
model. 
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